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Abstract
We focus on political violence as a mechanism that allows the political leader to
fight off opposition and increase his chances of re-election. In a collusive equilibrium,
the leader allocates a bribe to the army, and the latter responds by producing political
violence. Such an equilibrium is more likely, the larger are the public resources avail-
able to the leader; the lower is army’s potential punishment and salary offered by the
opposition regime; the more severe is the incumbent’s potential punishment; and when
the political leader is sufficiently patient, but the army is shortsighted enough.
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1 Introduction
The third wave of democratisation swept over Sub-Saharan Africa in the beginning of the
1990s. It was at this time that most of the leaders still holding on to one-party politics
finally gave in to the aspirations of active civil groups and demands of international donors
to establish multi-party systems. Recurrent elections are now held in all but a few countries.
But regular multi-party elections has not guaranteed fully liberal democratic practices
with free and fair competition on access to power. Scholars (e.g. Levitsky and Way 2002;
van de Walle 2003; Schedler 2006) generally agree on that many of these countries are lead
by authoritarian regimes employing diverse repressive measures, a characteristic arguably
exacerbated by the absence of strong politico-legal institutions. An interesting feature in
the multi-party Africa is the longevity of regimes and multiple electoral victories of individual
leaders. Indeed, currently more than 25 % of Sub-Saharan countries have had the same leader
holding on to power for at least 13 years1.
Yet in terms of economic and social performance, a large part of these countries rank at
the bottom of the income and human development charts, while receiving substantial amounts
of foreign aid, or possessing significant natural resources, the phenomenon commonly referred
to as the ’resource curse’. Furthermore, most of these countries have been reported to be
among the most corrupt in the world2. In view of these factors, it is puzzling how so many
leaders with poor economic, social and administrative performance hold on to power when
the citizens have the opportunity to replace them in the elections.
In this paper, we construct a game-theoretical model to answer the question of how corrupt,
authoritarian leaders with weak economic and social performance maintain power in countries
with recurrent elections. The model has the novel aspect of emphasising the use of political
violence as a key mechanism used by political leaders with the objective of undermining the
1These are Angola (28 yrs), Burkina Faso (20 yrs), Cameroon (25 yrs) Chad (17 yrs), Equatorial Guinea
(28 yrs), Gabon (40 yrs), Gambia (13 yrs), Guinea (23 yrs), Sudan (18 yrs), Uganda (21 yrs) and Zimbabwe
(27 yrs), with the years in power of the incumbent in parentheses. Another country would be Togo whose
president Gnassingbe Eyadema died while in office in 2005 after 38 years in power.
2Governance Matters 2007. Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996-2006.
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efforts of the political opposition and influencing the electoral outcome to guarantee their own,
often longstanding survival. As such, the focus of the paper is on a collusive agreement formed
between the leader and, arguably, the most powerful group in a society, the military. In a
collusive equilibrium, a leader offers the army a bribe, and the latter, presumably corruptible,
responds by producing politically motivated violence. The equilibrium may exist when the
size of the bribe that the army demands is at most as large as the maximum bribe that the
leader is prepared to pay. Thus, particular attention is given to the circumstances under
which an agreement of the sort may arise and is sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Our comparative static results give foundation to several policy recommendations that
may be of interest to policy makers within and outside Africa and other developing countries
around the world. Firstly, higher revenues from foreign aid or rents from natural resources,
contributing to a larger public budget available to the leader, increase the likelihood of a
collusive equilibrium. Similarly, Acemoglu et al. (2004) observe that such revenues help a
kleptocrat buy off opponents and maintain power, while Robinson et al. (2006) conclude that
resource booms associate with increased (inefficient) investments into political survival. In
addition to explaining the longterm survival of certain leaders and their regimes, we study
and analyse the origins and existence of political violence, prevalent in contemporary Africa.
An important question is also whether a third party, within or outside Africa, should
provide support to the political opposition in its struggle to replace the authoritarian leader.
Our results indicate that a biased financial or military support to the benefit of the opposi-
tion could indeed prevent the emergence of political violence, and thus increase opposition’s
chances of gaining power.
Another dimension to explore is the role of retribution in fighting the longevity of a
corrupt leader. We conclude that whereas the prospect of a harsher punishment will make the
incumbent less eager to give up power, the effect is opposite when the military is concerned.
This suggests that any possibility of transferring power in countries like Robert Mugabe’s
Zimbabwe may require promises of immunity and peaceful, possibly wealthy retirement. On
the other hand, the anticipation by the top military officers of the establishment and existing
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rulings of international tribunals may have the effect of restricting their willingness to violently
interfere with the free and fair electoral process.
Finally, we find that the collusive equilibrium is more likely the higher is leader’s discount
factor. For a patient leader, the value of being in power tomorrow is larger, this encouraging
him to consume less today. As to the army, the opposite holds, and the collusive equilibrium
is more likely the lower is army’s discount factor. According to our interpretation of this
perhaps counterintuitive result, the military, in this case, values the payoff in democracy
more, thus demanding a larger bribe for producing political violence.
The present paper was inspired by the work of Acemoglu et al. (2004) who formally
analyse the mechanisms that enable a kleptocrat to maintain the support of relevant groups.
The analysis is based on the ability of the kleptocrat to employ divide-and-rule strategy. More
recently, Padro´ i Miquel (2007) argued that the unpredictability of successional procedures is
the key issue in enabling a kleptocrat to steal even from his own supporter group.
The existing literature on dictatorships also includes Grossman (1991), Grossman and Noh
(1994), McGuire and Olson (1996), Wintrobe (1998), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), who present models focusing on the equilibrium behaviour
of a ruler in setting tax rates, as well as provision of public goods and distribution of income,
so as to maximise his utility while satisfying the constraint of staying in power.
Moreover, our model shares features with those constructed to analyse electoral compe-
tition in countries with weak democratic institutions. Ellman and Wantchekon (2000) study
how the outcome of elections is determined by the ability of the stronger party to cause un-
rest, and La Ferrera and Bates (2001) show that the optimal combination of public good and
security services depends on their marginal costs as well as the personal characteristics of the
competing politicians. On the other hand, Robinson and Torvik (2005) argue that inefficient
investments are a way for politicians to distinguish themselves from their competitors and
collect support. While incorporating the event of elections into the model, our primary inter-
est is in the collusive behaviour of the leader and the military. In a sense, the elections only
serve as an explicit motivation for the leader to try collusion with the army.
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Finally, we could loosely relate the paper to the theory of political transitions (e.g. Ace-
moglu and Robinson 2001, 2006).
Zimbabwe is an example of a country with multiparty elections and an authoritarian
regime3. The particularly curious aspect of the Zimbabwean experience is the longevity of
Robert Mugabe’s regime coupled with poor economic and social conditions. The economic
meltdown has reached record levels, not only in the way some key economic variables have long
been uncontrollable, but also in the contrast of how once a promising, industrialised economy
with an efficient agricultural sector has suffered substantial loss in productivity during nearly
28 years of independence that Zimbabwe has been under Mugabe’s leadership4.
The economic hardship is more often than not associated with controversial policies imple-
mented during the leadership of Mugabe, such as the land reform program, mainly executed
during the 1990s, and the beginning of the current decade5. The controversy of Mugabe’s rule
also lays in his taste for lavish lifestyle, while his fellow citizens suffer under extreme poverty6.
Contrary to the general experience of African countries, namely, that the opposition groups
are dispersed and weak, there has been an organised and active opposition functioning in
Zimbabwe since 1999. Although there had previously been a variety of opposition movements,
it was the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) that seriously challenged President
Mugabe and his party, Zanu-PF, for the first time. In the 2000 parliamentary elections,
Zanu-PF received 48.6 % of the votes, while MDC finished very close with 47 %7. It is
3Freedom House currently classifies Zimbabwe as ’Not Free’, with political rights attributed the score of
7 (lowest), and civil liberties with the score of 6. See also Sachikonye (2002), Bush and Szeftel (2002) and
Kagoro (2005) for discussion on the authoritarian features of the Zimbabwean state.
4According to the IMF (2007), the inflation rate in 2006 was 1,017 %, and is projected to reach 2,879 %
in 2007, while real GDP was reduced by 4.8 % in 2006, and is expected to shrink further in 2007 (-5.7 %) and
2008 (-3.6 %). Upto 80 % of the population is estimated to be unemployed and under the poverty line. In
2005, IMF reported that 40 % of the population was in need of food aid. For an account on the economic and
political decline, in particular, the factors that initially launched the downturn in the 1990s, see Sachikonye
(2002).
5That the agricultural production has decreased substantially following the reform, has had an effect on
unemployment as hundreds of thousands of farm workers have become unemployed (IMF 2005). In addition,
it has deprived the former farm workers and their families of health services and schools as the new settlers
have few resources to maintain these services (Sachikonye 2003).
6In February 2007, Mugabe celebrated his 83rd birthday with 20,000 guests. ”Mugabe party mocks the
starving nation”, The Sunday Times, 25 February 2007.
7African Elections Database (2007).
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against the background of the constantly worsening economic and social conditions, on one
hand, and the existence of an alternative government in the form of the MDC, on the other,
that it is puzzling as to how president Mugabe and his regime succeed in maintaining the
power in a country with recurrent elections.
A prominent feature in the Zimbabwean society today is violence. There are numerous
reports that state the high incidence of politically motivated violence, directed at the op-
position’s leadership as well as its supporters, not only during pre-electoral period but also
on the actual election days as well as after8. The remarkable feature of the emergence of
the violence is that it coincides with the formation of MDC in 1999. The run-up to the 2000
Parliamentary elections was marked with unprecedented levels of intimidation and abuse, and
ever since violence has been an integral part of Mugabe’s and his party’s campaigning9. The
number of individuals attacked after 2000 has been reported to exceed 30,00010. The figure is
short of the massive scale destruction operation, Operation Murambatsvina in 2005, in which
businesses and residences of over 700,000 people were torn down11.
The army have repeatedly been assigned as the main body in organisation and production
of this violence12. It is also a commonly known fact that the top officers of the military enjoy
generous privileges granted by president Mugabe. One form of the privileged treatment is
nomination of former military officers in civilian posts as heads of companies or state organi-
sations, or in influential positions in Zanu-PF. Some have taken up posts as ambassadors. The
top brass of the military has not been sided in accumulation of commercial connections. Sev-
eral current or retired top rank officials have stakes in private enterprises13. Moreover, these
8See reports by the European Union (2000), International Crisis Group (2002) and Kagwanja (2005).
9Ibid.
10Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2007).
11United Nations (2005).
12Strictly speaking, the army is not the only instance responsible for political violence. In fact, what is
generally considered as the security forces include the military, the Central Intelligence Office (CIO), police
and youth militia, each one having been associated with violent activities, such as harassing and detaining
opposition leadership and other supporters, invading white owned farms during the peak of the land reform,
and so forth. However, army’s participation in political violence is fundamental. Not only have several CIO
officers a military past, but the army is also responsible for the training of the youth militia. Moreover, the
structure, discipline and the machinery that the military possess guarantee that it can be mobilised to rapidly
access any part of the country. As such, we refer to the security forces simply as the army.
13The Kingdom of the Officers. Indian Ocean Newsletter, No. 1148, 17/09/2005; Stalinists Turn to Busi-
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individuals have benefited from lucrative deals within the diamond industry struck between
the DRC and Zimbabwe in the end of the 1990s, coinciding with Zimbabwe’s involvement in
the Congo war14.
Political involvement of the security forces is blatant; even active officers are members
of Zanu-PF. While such involvement has allowed the state to claim monopoly over the use
of violence, it has possibly also protected the regime from a military coup15. What this
implies for the opposition is lack of any control over the army, and thus incapability to resort
to violence in a large scale, organised manner. The MDC has not either been reported to
maintain any sort of paramilitary force. Its efforts to switch the regime have mainly consisted
of variably active rallying over the years of its existence. In the recent years there have been
a few protests including a successful general strike in 2003.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we present the
model, and in section 3 we discuss its unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, in
which the actions of each player are independent of the history of play. Section 4 extends
the model to account for history dependent actions. We construct and analyse the incentive
compatibility conditions, which, if satisfied, characterise the circumstances under which a
collusive equilibrium may exist. We also study the comparative statics and discuss the policy
implications that rise from the results of the model. Examination of the efficient collusion
gives us more detailed information about how levels of political violence and bribery evolve
with changes in parameter values. In section 5 we present an example where the model is
solved using specific functional forms. In section 6 we introduce an application of the model,
and conclude in section 7. All proofs are located in the appendix, section 8.
nessmen. Indian Ocean Newsletter, No. 1140, 25/06/2005.
14United Nations (2004).
15Kagwanja (2005).
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2 A Model
We consider an infinite-horizon, dynamic political game with three players: Leader (L), Oppo-
sition (D), and the Army (A). Leader is corrupt, authoritarian and aims to maximise his own
personal utility. The objective of the opposition leader is to replace the leader and establish
a properly functioning democracy in the country.
The army, represented by few top rank officers, is assumed to be corruptible. The sig-
nificance of the army in the model originates from its preparedness to intimidate, abuse or
even torture opposition party members and supporters; that is, to produce organised political
violence with the intention to interfere with the free and fair electoral process16. Production
of political violence is not the primary function of the military, and the senior officers must be
sufficiently compensated so as to give them an incentive to mobilise their troops to undertake
this costly activity. We should stress that, while the army’s objective is to maximise its utility
(i.e. the payoffs of the few top rank officers), it has no specific preference about the leader
per se.
In each period t (t = 1, 2...), the country can be in one of the two political states, St ∈
{L,D}, designating which politician assumes power. Note that S0 = L, and that D is an
absorbing state. The politician in power has exclusive access to K  0, the total resources,
available each period. K is considered as a proxy for the public budget that correlates with
the size of the economy, and is assumed to be exogenously given, fixed and constant17.
A key element of the game is the electoral competition between the incumbent and the
opposition leader. The competition culminates to the elections that take place every period,
and the outcome is contingent on two main factors. The first is opposition’s electoral cam-
16In Zimbabwe, for example, the security forces are involved in other tasks that restrict opposition’s activi-
ties, such as physically preventing party meetings or rallies, or work in favour of Mugabe’s support, an example
of which is provision of food aid primarily to areas and people regarded as loyal to the regime (Human Rights
Watch, 2003). Because of the prevalence of the actual physical violence in the contemporary Zimbabwe, on
one hand, and the obvious human right violating nature of these other activities, on the other, we refer to all
of these activities of the military as political violence.
17Alternatively, K could be endogenised. For instance, an increase in violence would reduce the total
resources of the economy. This could reflect the extent of damage to the agricultural production and thus
total output, caused by the violent farm invasions. Here, in order to focus attention to other key strategic
forces at play, K is fixed. In an extension that we are currently working on, K is endogenised.
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paigning, and its intensity is captured by the effort level, eD ≥ 0. Secondly, we argue that
political violence has an effect on the election results. Army’s choice of effort, eA ≥ 0, mea-
sures the extent of this violence. The leader, L, can try to indirectly influence both eA and
eD by allocating shares of K to the army and opposition. His decision variables, BA ≥ 0 and
BD ≥ 0, designate these shares18.
Importantly, army’s share, BA, of the total resources will be privately consumed by the
top brass of the military, while the non-corrupt opposition will distribute its share, BD, for
public consumption. In other words, allocating part of K to the opposition represents sharing
the public resources with the citizens, who are the main concern of the opposition.
The probability of the incumbent (i.e. the leader, L) staying in power is captured by
an exogenous re-election probability function: pi (eA, eD), which is twice differentiable, con-
cave and increasing in eA, but decreasing in eD
19. Army’s effort increases the value of the
probability function, as more voters are intimidated from voting the opposition. Opposition’s
efforts affect the value of pi (eA, eD) negatively as its campaigning attracts more votes for
itself. By assumption, these efforts are substitutes20. Also, we postulate that pi (0, 0) > 0,
reflecting the incumbency advantage of the longterm leader. In general, pi (eA, eD) ∈ (0, 1) for
all eA, eD ∈ [0,∞); There is always some uncertainty as to the outcome of the elections.
The costs of exerting effort, or of political action, come in the form of punishments.
Opposition’s punishment, PD (eD), will be overseen by the incumbent leader, but only when
he is in power. If opposition wins, it will not be punished. Army’s punishment, LA (eA), will
be executed by the opposition, but only in the case that the latter assumes power. But if the
18Since in part because such allocations involve illegal bribery, the leader is unable to commit ex ante
(contractually) on allocating certain shares in return for certain effort levels. Hence, he cannot directly
influence effort levels.
19The main focus of the model is how to influence the electoral outcome through the incentives of the
three players of the model, not the citizenry, to take certain actions. In particular, we are interested in the
possible collusive arrangement between the leader and the army, and only indirectly how this affects the voting
behaviour. Hence, we content with an exogenous probability of re-election function and do not aim to model
the voting process explicitly.
20Consider opposition’s effort, eD. It seems plausible that the productivity of this effort, at the margin, is
lowered by increasing army’s effort by a unit. For instance, opposition’s supporters may be prevented by the
security forces to attend a rally.
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leader is re-elected, army will go unpunished21. Both PD (eD) and LA (eA) are increasing and
concave in the respective efforts, and assumed exogenous, one-shot punishments so that, once
undergone, the offenses do not carry on to the successive periods22.
We point out an important distinction between the punishments and political violence.
Political violence (i.e. the effort of the army) targets the whole entity of people associated
with the opposition movement, whereas punishments apply only to the elite of each group,
namely, the top brass of the military or the leadership of the opposition23.
The per period game structure can be described as follows. Depending on the election
results of the last period, say t − 1, the economy starts the next period in one of the two
states, St = L, or St = D. Note that if St−1 = L, we may have that St = L or a regime switch
to St = D. But if St−1 = D, it follows that St = D. Democracy is an absorbing state, so that
if the regime, in any period t− 1, has been switched to St = D, it stays as such forever and
the payoffs of each player are determined as will be described below24. Essentially, no more
actions will be taken.
But if the leader, in t − 1, wins and stays in power, we begin the next period with the
political state as St = L, and have the four stage game, Γt (L), played in that period, of which
the timing is as follows:
1. Army and opposition choose their efforts (eA, eD) simultaneously.
2. The leader chooses BA and BD (allocates K).
3. Opposition’s punishment, PD (eD), implemented.
21The punishment of the army would comprise long prison sentences or significant fines. The punishment
of the opposition’s leadership may be considered relatively more severe, such as being imprisoned without
charges and fair trial, or even being persecuted by the secret services, tortured and killed.
22The history independence of the punishment implies that, since we regard a single period as the time
between two elections, the offenses committed during this time, which is several years, will contribute to the
punishment. But offenses from the preceding electoral periods will be forgone. We are currently working on
an extension where we relax this assumption.
23The fact that punishments are directed only at a restricted group implies that the costs of executing them
is insignificant. But from the point of view of the army or opposition incurring a punishment, the cost is
substantial. Hence, they are included in each of these players’ respective payoff functions as shown below.
24The rational behind this simplifying assumption is that we assume that once the leader is out of power,
he will not be able to run for elections again, as he may be brought to justice, be forced to leave the country
and so on. Essentially, there will be no more elections where the particular incumbent is one of the major
players.
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4. Elections take place. At the outcome of the elections, time elapses and the game
moves to the next period.
That the leader makes his decision only after the choices of the army and opposition
emphasises the fact, which is common knowledge, that the former cannot credibly commit to
any particular allocations of K. This is due to the lack of political and legal accountability,
prevalent in weak states, which ensures that the leader will not face serious consequences
when failing to comply with an agreement. Thus, the army and opposition choose first, and
base their decisions on the anticipation that, at his turn, the leader will choose what is best
for him.
Supposing that the leader, in any period t, wins the elections, the payoffs in that period
are K−BA−BD for himself, BA+ b′ for the army, and BD−PD (eD) for the opposition. The
game then continues, like before, in the next period. If opposition wins the elections, the next
period starts with St+1 = D, and the game ends. The payoffs the players then receive each
period thereafter are u for the leader, a fixed salary, b, for the army paid by the opposition
regime and K − b for the opposition. Further, in the first of such period only, the army is
punished by opposition for political violence, eA, by a punishment of LA (eA).
We define b′ as the salary that the army receives in the incumbent regime, and BA as an
additional monetary incentive, or a bribe, granted to the top military officers in exchange for
political violence. For simplicity, b′ is normalised to zero, and b actually denotes the difference
between army’s salaries in the two regimes. We postulate that K  b.
Note that u may be positive or negative and can be broadly defined as a proxy for the
institutional quality and general willingness to punish the leader once he is out of power.
Whether u ≥ 0 or u < 0, it will be assumed that K  u. This should be plausible since K
represents the size of the public budget, available to the leader, every period, whereas u is
the per period flow of utility to a single agent, in this case the leader.
The respective discount factors of each player are β for the leader, δ for the army, and γ
for the opposition, and β, δ, γ ∈ [0, 1).
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3 Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
To start with, we describe the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE), in which the
equilibrium actions in each period are independent of the history of play.
At the third stage of the game, before the elections, the leader observes the efforts chosen
by the army and the opposition, and then chooses the distribution of the public resources. It
follows from the nature of a stationary equilibrium, that the leader, in such an equilibrium,
sets BSA = 0 and B
S
D = 0, keeping all the resources himself.
Finding the Nash equilibrium in efforts, we move backwards to the first stage of the game.
Both the army and opposition anticipate there will be no benefits from the leader and take
this into account as they decide their effort levels. Given BSA = 0, it turns out that e
S
A = 0 is
the subgame perfect choice for the army in the stationary equilibrium.
Opposition has different objectives than the army, this affecting its choice of effort level.
The goal is to establish democracy in the country, which can be done by winning the elections
and obtaining access to K. The probability of the leader’s re-election is not increased by
army’s effort, so the opposition expects a relatively better chance of winning than if the
army was to choose to exert effort. Given eSA = 0 and B
S
D = 0, we find a unique solution
for the opposition, eSD > 0. In choosing the effort level, opposition trades off the benefit
from winning, (K − b), against the cost of punishment, PD (eD), from action. Given these
informal arguments, proposition 1 describes the unique SSPE, which is formally proven in the
appendix.
Proposition 1. In the unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, the leader keeps all
of the resources to himself, there will be no political violence produced by the army, and the
opposition will choose some positive amount of effort for its electoral campaign.
That there is complete absence of political violence against the people is appealing in this
equilibrium. In addition, there is some chance to moving to democracy as the opposition
runs its electoral campaigns actively. But the outcome is not entirely ideal. The government
is corrupt, consuming the whole of the public budget by itself. This means that the people
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suffer under poverty. Since eSD > 0, opposition will be punished.
Thus, the model predicts that, despite of the punishment, PD (eD), opposition participates
in electoral campaigns. It also accounts for the fact that the citizens are subjected to poverty,
i.e., BSD = 0. In contrast, the model fails to replicate the occurrence of political violence, a fact
impossible to ignore with countries like Zimbabwe in question. To address this shortcoming,
we will in section 4 construct another type of equilibrium. But before proceeding, let us
complete the analysis with some discussion on the comparative statics of the SSPE.
In the unique SSPE with BSA = B
S
D = 0, e
S
A = 0 and e
S
D > 0, the expected payoffs to
players (leader, army and opposition, respectively), in state S = L, just after the leader has
distributed the public resources are as follows:
V SL =
K
1− βpis +
β (1− pis)
1− βpis
(
u
1− β
)
, (1)
V SA =
δ (1− pis)
1− δpis
(
b
1− δ
)
, (2)
and
V SD = −
PD
(
eSD
)
1− γpis +
γ (1− pis)
1− γpis
(
K − b
1− γ
)
, (3)
where pis = pi
(
0, eSD
)
.
First note that an increase in b increases V SA and decreases V
S
D , but does not affect V
S
L . The
effect of a change in b on V SA is independent of army’s effort. Since b
′ = 0, an increase in b would
make opposition regime even more attractive for the army, as the difference between army’s
salaries in the two regimes would become larger. As for the punishment, in the equilibrium
eSA = 0, so that LA (eA) has no effect on V
S
A . Since B
S
A = 0, the army has no incentive to exert
any effort in this equilibrium, regardless of the values that the other parameters may take.
More interestingly, a change in b does have an effect on opposition’s incentive to exert
effort. An increase in b would weaken opposition’s incentives to establish democracy, leading
to a decrease in eSD. By a similar argument, an increase in K would lead to an increase in
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opposition’s effort. A change in the punishment, PD (eD), also influences opposition’s choice.
A harder punishment decreases eSD.
That a change in either K, b or PD (eD) has an effect on e
S
D implies that it unambiguosly
affects pis. In the equlibrium, eSA = 0, so that the only choice affecting the value of pi
s is
opposition’s effort. Given that K − b is sufficiently large, in particular, to outweigh the pun-
ishment, PD (eD), opposition has an incentive to fight for democracy and induce a relatively
high level of effort in order to switch the regime.
This suggests that democracy is most likely to be achieved when either the public budget
is sufficiently high or army’s salary and opposition’s punishment sufficiently small.
These results can be reconciled with countries employing a multi-party system, that are
suffering from corruption, but not organised and countrywide state sponsored repression. As
argued above, this is not the case in Zimbabwe, and, we should add, a number of other
Sub-Saharan African countries. We will in the following study a potential collusion between
the leader and the army, to determine the conditions under which both political violence
and bribery emerge. We will also see if such an arrangement, should it exist, reduces the
possibility of switching the regime into democracy, or, in other words, whether the maximum
probability to switching into democracy prevails in the stationary equilibrium.
4 Collusion between the Leader and the Army
A collusive outcome between the leader and the army is characterised as the army choosing
a positive amount of violence, and the leader allocating a positive share of public resources
to the army, this pair of actions taking place in each period. Such collusive behaviour is
consistent with Zimbabwean reality. As discussed above, the Zimbabwean army is effectively
producing politically motivated violence, while Mugabe guarantees that its top brass receive
privileged treatment. The opposition has no control over the army and is an outsider to the
collusive agreement between the two other players. Nevertheless, it still maintains its efforts
to win enough support to replace Mugabe, despite of the consequent punishment.
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4.1 Collusive Equilibrium as a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
We already mentioned that the leader cannot credibly commit to a contract of allocating
BA > 0 to the army. In the stationary equilibrium, this resulted in no political violence or
bribery. Here we examine whether in a non-stationary equilibrium, with actions dependent
on history, there is a possibility for an intertemporal, collusive agreement to be sustained in
a self-enforcing manner between the leader and the army.
The collusive equilibrium path is to be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium path,
by standard kinds of ”trigger” strategies where a unilateral deviation by either the army or
the leader from the collusive path moves play to the unique SSPE. To conveniently describe
this non-stationary SPE, we will use the concepts of two paths of play and a transition rule.
The two paths of play refer to those of the collusive path and the stationary (punishment)
path. In essence, the collusive path of play consists of such actions, within each period, that
the army chooses to produce some violence (e∗A > 0), and the leader allocates a positive share
of the public resources to the army (B∗A > 0). We focus on collusive paths in which B
∗
D = 0.
The transition rule states that in the event of the army choosing a different level of effort
(e′A 6= e∗A), and/or the leader failing to allocate the agreed part of K to the army (B′A 6= B∗A),
the play immediately switches to the stationary equilibrium path. For the army, the costs of
deviating from the collusive path are incurred within the same period, as the leader withholds
the distribution of K as of his turn to act, the second stage of the stage game. The army can
punish the leader only as of the beginning of the next period.
In its position as an outsider to the agreement, opposition’s strategy is to choose its best
response to the collusive choices of B∗A > 0 by the leader and e
∗
A > 0 by the army. The
incumbent’s re-election probability in the collusive equilibrium is pic = pi (e∗A, e
∗
D). But as a
result of deviation, it becomes pid = pi (0, e∗D).
Let us now derive the conditions, if any, under which the proposed collusive path of play is
a subgame perfect equilibrium. Before turning to the derivation and analysis of the incentive
compatibility conditions, we first establish:
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Lemma 1. Fix an arbitrary collusive equilibrium (B∗A ≥ 0, e∗A ≥ 0, B∗D = 0). Opposition’s
effort, e∗D, in this equilibrium is such that pi
c > pid > pis.
Proof. See the appendix.
4.2 Incentive Compatibility Conditions
Along the proposed collusive equilibrium path with B∗A > 0, e
∗
A > 0 and B
∗
D = 0, and with e
∗
D
as the best response of the opposition, leader’s equilibrium payoff, in any subgame, as he is
about to choose the distribution of the public resources is
V CL = (K −B∗A) + β
[
(1− pic) u
1− β + pi
cV CL
]
. (4)
Deviation from the collusive path of play and the subsequent switch to the stationary path
of play results in
V DL = K + β
[
(1− pic) u
1− β + pi
cV SL
]
, (5)
where
V SL = K + β
[
(1− pis) u
1− β + pi
sV SL
]
. (6)
Incentive compatibility requires that V CL ≥ V DL . Solving for V CL in (4) and substituting (6)
into (5) to solve for V DL , we obtain, after rearranging, the maximum amount of the bribe that
the leader is willing to give away in exchange for army’s effort:
B∗A ≤ B¯A ≡
β2pic (pic − pis) (K − u)
1− βpis . (7)
From (7), the collusive re-election probability, pic, must be strictly higher than the stationary
re-election probability, pis, for it to be worth the leader’s while to propose collusion to the
army and be willing to reward it in the first place. Lemma 1 shows that this is indeed the
case.
Similarly for the army, the proposed collusive equilibrium path of play (B∗A > 0, e
∗
A >
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0, B∗D = 0, e
∗
D > 0) brings the equilibrium payoff of
V CA = B
∗
A + δ
[
(1− pic)
(
b
1− δ − LA (e
∗
A)
)
+ picV CA
]
, (8)
while deviating from the collusive path of play and the subsequent switch to the stationary
path of play results in
V DA = δ
[(
1− pid)( b
1− δ
)
+ pidV SA
]
, (9)
where25
V SA = δ
[
(1− pis)
(
b
1− δ
)
+ pisV SA
]
. (10)
Incentive compatibility requires that V CA ≥ V DA . Again, solving for V CA and V DA and rear-
ranging produces the minimum share of the public resources that is compatible with army’s
incentives to collude:
B∗A ≥ BA ≡ δ
(
pic − pid − δpic (pis − pid)
1− δpis
)
b+ δ (1− pic)LA (e∗A) . (11)
Army’s share of K must outweigh the expected punishment, LA (e
∗
A), as well as the discounted
salary multiplied by the expression in parantheses. This expression is positive26.
4.3 Existence of the Collusive Equilibrium
In the previous section, we derived the individual incentive compatibility conditions for the
two parties of the potential collusive agreement. From (7) and (11), this implies that the size
of the bribe acceptable to the leader is the upper bound
(
B¯A
)
of possible values that B∗A can
take, while the lower bound (BA) is given by army’s minimum requirement.
Proposition 2. The collusive path of play, characterised by B∗A > 0, e
∗
A > 0, B
∗
D = 0 and
e∗D > 0 as the solution to opposition’s maximisation problem, is sustainable as a subgame
perfect equilibrium, if and only if (7) and (11) are satisfied.
25Note that LA
(
eDA
)
= 0 and LA
(
eSA
)
= 0.
26Recall that
(
pic − pid) > 0, and pis − pid < 0.
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In the following we discuss the conditions on the primitives of the model under which both
(7) and (11) are satisfied, as well as when they fail to hold. The analysis will be complemented
with policy implications that may be relevant to decision makers within and outside countries
with repressive regimes.
4.4 Comparative Statics
It is straightforward to verify that (7) and (11) hold if and only if B¯A ≥ BA, i.e.,
δ
(
pic − pid − δpic (pis − pid)
1− δpis
)
b+ δ (1− pic)LA (e∗A) ≤
β2pic (pic − pis) (K − u)
1− βpis . (12)
Examination of (12) shows that the collusive equilibrium is more likely, when27:
1. The public budget is sufficiently large. Increasing K increases V CL relatively more than
V DL , improving leader’s incentives to play collusion. Alternatively, an increase in K increases
the maximum bribe the leader is willing to give away.
The public budget, K, only enters to the right hand side of (12), since the army does not
have direct access to it28. Since K is directly available to the leader, it could include foreign
aid donated by the international community, as well as rents from natural resources. We
base this claim on the common wisdom about a core problematic feature of weak institutions;
corrupt leaders may expropriate the foreign aid and/or natural resource rents and use it
controversially to their own benefit.
Empirical studies have established that foreign aid and resource booms fail to promote
growth or even worsen the economic and political conditions in a country with weak demo-
cratic institutions (See Burnside and Dollar 2000, Easterly and Levine 2003 and Knack 2000
for studies on foreign aid, and Mehlum et al. 2006, and Sachs and Warner 1995, 1999 and
27As is commonly done, we say that the collusive equilibrium is ”more likely” to exist the greater is the
range of the discount factors for which the IC conditions are satisfied (i.e. the larger the difference B¯A−BA).
28We point out that here the army is simply a utility maximiser, and therefore not interested in assuming
power itself to obtain direct access to K. In future research, the aim is to extend the model to allow for the
possibility that the army may actually try to replace the ruler.
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Ross 1999 for diverse mechanisms through which the resource curse may take effect)29.
Acemoglu et al. (2004) formally show that foreign aid and natural resource rents provide
resources for a kleptocratic leader to buy off opponents. Robinson et al. (2006) conclude
that since resource booms increase the value of being in power, higher rents associate with
more resources invested, inefficiently, into guaranteeing the political survival. Our result is
closest in spirit to these two studies linking foreign aid or resource booms inversely to political
outcomes. However, by incorporating political violence into the model, we consider another
adverse consequence that can be caused by such resources in a country with weak democratic
institutions.
From (12), it is clear that the collusive equilibrium is more likely to be sustained, when:
2. Army’s salary in opposition regime is sufficiently small. The impact of an increase
in b is strictly larger in V CA than in V
D
A , and the lower bound of the bribe has to increase to
account for such a change30.
A positive change in army’s salary, b, implies that the prospect of democracy becomes more
attractive for the army, as it will have more resources under the opposition regime. Again,
there is scope for a third party to interfere with the collusive equilibrium. An international
actor could provide military or economic support to the opposition force in order to prevent
complete chaos or civil war from breaking out in the event of a regime switch. This could be
some amount, s > 0, so that the army’s one shot payoff in opposition regime would become
b+ s− LA (eA), and army’s incentives to collude with the leader become lower.
Somewhat relatedly, Collier et al. (2004) argue that a biased military intervention, to
the side of the rebels, has a positive impact on shortening the length of the the civil war,
as it equalises the capabilities of defence. In our framework, the support to the side of the
opposition would be to reduce the gap between the military capacities in the two alternative
regimes.
29Mehlum et al. (2006) conclude that the quality of institution determines the impact on the economy of
the natural resource, while Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999) attribute the effect to trade related issues, such as
the movements in the real exchange rates.
30For this to be true we need δ pi
d(1−pis)
(1−δpis) +
(
1− pid) > (1−pic)(1−δpic) , which simplifies to pic−pid+δpic (pid − pis) > 0.
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These two comparative statics results reveal a contradictory nature of external financial
and/or military support to be considered by policy makers and aid donors: Such support,
in the hands of an abusive leader, tends to increase the likelihood of a repressive regime. In
contrast, it could positively contribute to the replacement of such a regime, when offered to
an opposition movement.
Furthermore, the collusive equilibrium is more likely, when:
3. Leader’s payoff in the opposition regime is sufficiently small. An increase in the value
of u will increase V DL at a higher rate, reducing the leader’s incentives to participate in the
collusion31. Moreover, from (7) it is clear that an increase in u reduces the size of B¯A.
We first note that a very small or negative u could represent a situation in which there is a
harsh punishment awaiting the retired or ousted leader to be executed by strong democratic
institutions. Vice versa for a large u. The model predicts that a decrease in u improves
leader’s incentives to collude, which, in turn, implies that there is a higher chance of political
violence against the opposition supporters.
A third party, could, through its influence on the institutional settings (e.g. independent
judiciary), or a domestic player, through its willingness to seek retribution, affect the value
of u, and thereby the leader’s decision to propose and maintain collusion with the army. In
light of our model, a milder punishment would increase the chances of replacing an unpopular
leader. Interestingly, the leader of the political opposition in Zimbabwe has publicly discussed
the possibility of granting immunity to President Mugabe in order to encourage his voluntary
departure from office32.
We also find that, the collusive equilibrium is more likely to hold, when:
4. Army’s punishment is mild enough. The punishment only occurs in the collusive equilib-
rium path of play, reducing the equilibrium payoff. An increase in LA (eA) leads to an increase
in BA, i.e., army’s minimum requirement for the bribe becomes larger.
A prominent institutional player, such as an international tribunal, could interfere with the
31This is true when 1−pi
c
1−βpic < (1− pic)+ βpi
c(1−pis)
1−βpis , or β (pi
c − pis)− pic+ pis < 0. The latter inequality holds
since β < 1.
32”Tsvangirai sees Mugabe’s end”, BBC, 2 April 2007.
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collusive equilibrium by announcing its aim to hold the army generals accountable for their
crimes against humanity. The precedents created by the International Criminal Tribunals for
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, as well as persecution of people responsible for Darfur’s
massacres, represent such interference. In our interpretation, since this would increase the
expected punishment, it would, consequently, mitigate army’s willingness to produce political
violence.
Finally, the collusive equilibrium is more likely, when:
5. The leader is sufficiently patient, while army is impatient enough. For the leader, a
higher β corresponds to a relatively larger public budget in the future. A more patient army
values democracy more, and demands a larger bribe.
A leader with a higher discount factor has more optimistic prospects about the future,
hence, he is prepared to consume less today, as the value of K is even higher tomorrow. In
contrast, an increase in δ increases the bribe that the army requires for its efforts, since the
salary and the potential punishment in opposition regime are both relatively larger.
Having established and analysed the conditions under which political violence may emerge
and is sustained, we now turn to briefly discussing, in the context of efficient collusion, how
the level of violence varies when the values of the parameters change.
4.5 Efficient Collusion
The set up of the model implies that the leader makes a take–it–or–leave–it offer. As such,
given the existence of a collusive equilibrium, it is the leader’s optimal choice that determines
the level of political violence and bribery. In essence, the parameter changes affect the level
of political violence through the (direct or indirect) connection they have with B∗A, the bribe.
The optimal size of the bribe for the leader is the lower bound, i.e.:
B∗A = δ
(
pic − pid − δpic (pis − pid)
1− δpis
)
b+ δ (1− pic)LA (e∗A) . (13)
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Intuitively, if the equality was not strict, the leader could increase his payoff by undercutting
B∗A by a small amount and still satisfy the constraint. We learn that the bribe that maximises
leader’s utility in collusion is an increasing function of e∗A. This is established in Proposition
3 and formally shown in the appendix.
Proposition 3. The optimal size of the bribe for the leader is the lower bound of the bribe.
The bribe is an increasing function of political violence.
From (13), we also see that the optimal bribe is an increasing function of army’s salary, b
and punishment, LA, in the opposition regime as well as its discount factor, δ. The implication
is that a change in the level of violence are caused by the changes in these parameters. The
intuition follows by noting that an increase in b, LA, or δ must be compensated by a decrease
in e∗A so as to keep the bribe unchanged.
Less straightforward is how ”leader’s parameters”, K, u, and β, affect the levels political
violence. To that end we totally differentiate the leader’s best response function. The results
are summarised in the corollary, and their mathematical derivation is located in the appendix.
Corollary 1. An increase in K or β leads to higher levels of political violence and bribery,
whereas an increase in u implies lower levels of political violence and bribery.
For the same level of utility, an increase in K compensates for the increase in the bribe,
resulting from the increase in army’s effort. Intuitively, larger resources increase the value of
being in power. The leader is prepared to give away a larger share to stay in office33.
The point made about the controversy of foreign aid becomes even more pressing. A
similar prediction was obtained by Olsson and Fors (2004), who study the motivations of two
distinct players, the state (that controls the rents from natural resources) and insurgents, to
engage in a conflict. They find that the optimal level of ruling party’s defence efforts increases
with rents from natural resources.
33It is worth noting that this result could be in the other direction, namely, lowerK would lead to an increase
in political violence. Such an argument would be based on the assumption that lower public resources – in the
sense of the GDP per capita – and, hence, lower standard of living of the citizens in general, would imply less
support for the incumbent, and, therefore, higher need for political violence in order to silence any opposition.
While plausible mechanism, we stress that our focus is not in the voting behaviour itself. The public resources
are to be shared between the leader and the army.
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Higher u implies that the leader is relatively better off in the stationary (punishment)
path of play. Losing power means losing relatively less utility. This change is reflected in
a smaller effort demanded from the army, and corresponds to a smaller bribe. In terms of
policy implications, this is in line with what we found previously.
As far as the leader’s discount factor, β, is concerned, the direct implication is that as
β increases, staying in office becomes relatively more valuable in the future. Thus, even a
smaller part of K will bring the same utility in the future, so the leader is willing to give a
larger bribe to the army.
In the following section, we conduct a similar exercise, but with specific functional forms
for pi, PD and LA.
5 A Worked Example
Adapting from Skaperdas (1996), the probability of re-election function will be attained the
form of a contest success function, pi =
(
eA
eA+eD
)
. For computational simplicity, army’s
punishment function is LA (eA) = e
2
A, while opposition’s punishment takes a linear form, i.e.,
PD (eD) = eD. The results from the calculations using these functional forms are in line with
the results from the general form functions as will be shown below34.
We focus essentially on the collusive equilibrium but point out that in the stationary
equilibrium, leader’s choice is BSA = B
S
D = 0, while the efforts of the army and opposition
are eSA = 0 and e
S
D = 0, respectively. It follows from these choices that the probability of
the incumbent’s re-election, pis =
(
eSA
eSA+e
S
D
)
= 0. There will always be a regime switch in the
stationary equilibrium. That the opposition now chooses eSD = 0 is due to the fact that since
the regime switch is certain, there is no need for the costly effort.
34Since the results in this section are derived in a significantly similar way to that in previous parts, their
proofs are omitted.
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5.1 Existence of collusive equilibrium
Since pis = 0, the incentive compatibility conditions are slightly simpler. Recalling from
section (4.2), V CL remains intact, but since pi
s = pid = 0, we have that35
V DL = K + β
[
(1− pic) u
1− β + pi
c
(
K + β
u
1− β
)]
. (14)
Similarly for the army, V DA becomes
V DA = δ
b
1− δ . (15)
We set V CL ≥ V DL and V CA ≥ V DA , and rearrange. The condition for the existence of the
collusive equilibrium is now:
δpicb+ δ (1− pic)LA (e∗A) ≤ β2 (pic)2 (K − u) . (16)
Importantly, the comparative static results from section (4.4) still apply.
5.2 Characteristics of the collusive equilibrium
Let us now study the leader’s re-election probability in collusion. By definition of the collusive
equilibrium, e∗A > 0. Hence, pi
c =
(
e∗A
e∗A+e
∗
D
)
> 0. Opposition’s best response in collusion
eD = −e∗A +
√
γe∗A
(
K − b
1− γpic
)
+ γe∗A
(
PD (e∗D)
1− γpic
)
, (17)
depends negatively on the salary, b, offered to the army, but positively on the public resources,
K, and the punishment. For any values of e∗A ≥ 0 and the parameters, we have eD > 0. It
follows that pic < 1. In the collusive equilibrium, the probability of the leader’s re-election is
strictly higher than in the stationary equilibrium (in which the probability is zero). There is
35It is straightforward to show that the army chooses eDA = 0 when it deviates. It follows that pi
d = 0.
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always a chance for the democracy to be established.
Finally, we briefly discuss the responses of political violence to changes in the values of the
relevant parameters. Maximising V CL w.r.t. eA and BA, again treating as binding constraint
army’s IC condition, we obtain the leader’s best response in collusion:
eA =
−δe∗D +
√
(δe∗D)
2 + δβ (1− β) (K − u)− δ2 (1− β) b
δ (1− β) . (18)
As before, and for the same reason, eA is increasing in K and β. Furthermore, we find that
political violence is reduced when b and u, or e∗D are increased. A higher e
∗
D results in a lower
value of the leader’s re-election in collusion, which, in turn, increases the expected punishment
of the army. Finally, the intensity of political violence is negatively related to army’s discount
factor, δ.
6 Venezuela and the leadership of Hugo Cha´vez
Though the model was originally motivated by the particular experience of Sub-Saharan
Africa, it is applicable to other developing countries with similar distinctive characteristics.
Venezuela, currently headed by president Hugo Cha´vez, has a multiparty system and a promi-
nent military increasingly involved with activities of the civil society.
A former Spanish colony, Venezuela gained independence in 1830. This is a country with
vast natural and mineral resources including huge reserves of oil, natural gas, coal, bauxite,
iron ore and 12 % of world’s known gold reserves. The principal source of revenue is oil,
generating about one-half of central government revenue, more than 80 % of export revenue
and approximately 25 % of the total GDP36. Due to the high dependence on oil revenue, the
performance of the Venezuelan economy reflects developments in the world oil prices.
Hugo Cha´vez rose to power in the 1998 presidential elections with 56% of the votes. His
victory was a result of several factors including rising discontent with the economic decline,
36Economist Intelligence Unit (2007).
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weakening of traditional partisan identities, and the general perception of widespread corrup-
tion in the nation’s major political parties. Nevertheless, his victory was remarkable in that
only seven years earlier he had been the leader of an unsuccessful coup against a democrati-
cally elected government (Canache 2002).
Venezuela has experienced a huge transformation in its civil-military relations under
Cha´vez’s leadership. Upon assuming the presidency, Cha´vez began what has turned out
to be an extensive politicisation of the armed force and a deterioriation of civilian control
over the military. The various measures taken by the president range from appointment of
active and retired military officers to perform civilian political and administrative functions
to his direct intervention in officer promotions and assignments. Additionally, the roles and
missions of the armed force have been concentrated on internal security, instead of giving
priority to national defense (Trinkunas 2005).
A concrete example of the importance of the military in fortifying the popularity of presi-
dent Cha´vez was Plan Bolivar, a social program launched in 2000. As Trinkunas notes, Plan
Bolivar constituted a broad incorporation of the armed forces into domestical political and
economic affaires. The program was aimed to readdress a wide range of defects in social
issues, such as in infrastructure, health care, education, unemployment and food distribution.
In December 2006, Cha´vez was re-elected with a comfortable 63 % of the votes. A
marginalised opposition failed to put up serious challenge for the incumbent37. The share
of the votes received by Cha´vez should be an indicator of his popularity among the elec-
torate. At the same time, it is true that despite the looming economic decline, the citizens
are still enjoying various benefits of the social program, such as the distribution of food aid.
Thus, what we currently observe in Venezuela is a high value of the re-election probability
function (pi (eA, eD)), low efforts of both the military (eA) and the opposition (eD), but a
positive share of public resources given to the opposition, i.e., BD > 0. Since opposition’s
effort is low, a high value of the probability function is consistent with our theory. The fact
that opposition’s low effort level coincides with a positive BD is not explicitly considered in
37Economist Intelligence Unit 2007.
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our framework, since we assume that BD = 0. But endogenising BD is something that future
research should take into account as it could provide interesting additional information about
opposition’s behaviour.
There are increasing concerns that the country is moving towards a restricted degree of
democracy. Widespread violence has not been reported. But the state has extended its control
of press, and exercised some threat and intimidation on voters (such as taking finger prints
on voting ballots) as well as opposition supporters in general38. In addition, coinciding with
high oil prices of recent years, there has been an increase in military spending since 2005.
Furthermore, the state has continued to broaden its control of the economy. In January 2007,
the government announced the nationalisation of Venezuela’s largest private company, the
dominant telecommunications company, CANTV39.
These observations reconcile with our predictions. A higher K associated with an increase
in BA is what we found earlier. That the state control of the economy has widened can be
interpreted as the state assuring itself more sources of revenues (increase the base for K) in
the event that the oil revenues would be reduced. Judging from the recent election results,
the popularity of Cha´vez is still sufficiently high for him to get re-elected without widespread
concern about the legitimacy of the electoral process. Nevertheless, his support could be
tested by the eventual economic decline, due to, if no other reason, but a global recession. It
is arguably in that sense that Cha´vez has built a state machinery that can be called upon
to produce extensive political violence in order to influence the electoral outcome. Indeed,
observers believe that if needed, Cha´vez will not hesitate to use brute force40.
7 Concluding remarks
Democracy is a relative concept. Post-colonial history of Zimbabwe and a number of other
African and developing countries has shown that introduction of multiparty system with
38International Crisis Group (2007).
39Economist Intelligence Unit (2007).
40International Crisis Group (2007).
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regular elections sometimes fails to guarantee circumstances in which the citizens freely choose
their representatives and the elected ones are held accontable for their actions. Authoritarian
regimes around the world resort to various methods in an often successful attempt to prolonge
their existence.
This paper contributes to the yet scarce game-theoretical literature on the political survival
of non-democratic leaders and their regimes. We have developed a dynamic model which
emphasises the role of military involvement and use of violence as the mechanism through
which the electoral outcome may be influenced.
We derived and analysed the conditions for the existence of a collusive equilibrium. In such
an equilibrium, the agreement concealed by the political leader and the military contributes
to the emergence of politically motivated violence. This produced a set of predictions that
might be insightful in thinking about prevention of political violence.
The model has produced a set of results that include the prediction that larger public
resources, which, within the framework of the model, account for foreign aid, and/or rents
from natural resources, increase the likelihood of the collusive equilibrium. Furthermore, the
model delivers insight into how a potential punishment of the abusive leader, to be realised
in the eventuality of a regime switch, actually encourages collusive behaviour. In contrast,
the punishment directed at the military is predicted to render the existence of the collusive
equilibrium less likely, as is an increase in the salary that the opposition party offers to the
army.
Another set of results was obtained from the examination of what, from the leader’s point
of view, could be considered as the optimal level of the existing violence and bribery. Larger
resources in hands of an abusive leader, tend to lead to higher levels of violence together with
increased bribery provided to the military. But prospects of wealthier and punishment-free
retirement encourages the leader to reduce the amount of bribery to the military, with the
consequence of inducing less political violence into the country.
On the other hand, stricter punishments to the army associate with lower levels of violence.
Finally, financial and military support to the opposition forces is predicted to appease the
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violence.
Possible extensions to the present model include relaxing the assumption that the violence
produced by the army in the previous electoral periods has no impact on the current punish-
ment. In the future, we will also aim to consider the possibility that the army have the option
of taking power establishing a military regime. Furthermore, future research should take into
account the volatile nature of democracy. Examples of countries where the characteristics of
regimes has shifted between various degrees of democracy and dictatorship are abundant.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof for Proposition 1
Let
(
BSA, B
S
D, e
S
A, e
S
D
)
be an arbitrary SSPE strategy profile and let V Si (i = L,A,D) denote
the equilibrium PDV of player i. It follows from the ’one-shot deviation principle’ (henceforth
OSDP) that the leader’s equilibrium PDV, V SL , satisfies:
V SL = maxVL = max{BA,BD≥0}
{K−BA−BD≥0}
(K −BA −BD) + β
[
(1− pi (eA, eD)) u
1− β + pi (eA, eD)V
S
L
]
,
(19)
where
V SL =
(
K −BSA −BSD
)
+ β
[
(1− pis) u
1− β + pi
sV SL
]
, (20)
with pis = pi
(
eSA, e
S
D
)
. Differentiating w.r.t. BA and BD:
∂VL
∂BA
=
∂VL
∂BD
= −1 (21)
which implies: BA = BD = 0. By the OSDP: B
S
A = B
S
D = 0. Given B
S
A = B
S
D = 0, it follows
from the OSDP that army’s equilibrium PDV, V SA , satisfies
V SA = maxVA = max{eA≥0}
δ
[
(1− pi (eA, eD))
(
b
1− δ − LA (eA)
)
+ pi (eA, eD)V
S
A
]
, (22)
where41
V SA = δ
[
(1− pis)
(
b
1− δ − LA
(
eSA
))
+ pisV SA
]
. (23)
Differentiating w.r.t. eA :
∂VA
∂eA
= −δ (1− pi (eA, eD))L′A (eA)− δpi1
(
b
1− δ − LA (eA)
)
+ δpi1V
S
A (24)
41Since BA = BSA = 0.
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We prove that eSA = 0, by contradiction. Suppose that e
S
A > 0. This implies that (24) equals
zero, i.e.:
−δ (1− pis)L′A
(
eSA
)
+ δpi1
[
V SA −
(
b
1− δ − LA
(
eSA
))]
= 0, (25)
which cannot hold since −δ (1− pis)L′A
(
eSA
)
< 0 and V SA −
(
b
1−δ − LA
(
eSA
))
< 0 as δ(1−pi
s)
1−δpis < 1.
Finally, given BSA = B
S
D = e
S
A = 0, the OSDP implies that opposition’s equilibrium PDV, V
S
D ,
satisfies:
V SD = maxVD = max{eD≥0}
[
−PD (eD) + γ
[
(1− pi (0, eD))
(
K − b
1− γ
)
+ pi (0, eD)V
S
D
]]
, (26)
where
V SD = −PD
(
eSD
)
+ γ
[
(1− pis)
(
K − b
1− γ
)
+ pisV SD
]
. (27)
Differentiating w.r.t. eD gives:
∂VD
∂eD
= −P ′D (eD)− γpi2
(
K − b
1− γ
)
+ γpi2V
S
D . (28)
After substituting for V SD , it follows that
∂VD
∂eD
= −P ′D (eD)− γpi2
(
1− γ (1− pi
s)
1− γpis
)(
K − b
1− γ
)
− γpi2
PD
(
eSD
)
1− γpis . (29)
Given our assumptions (pi2 < 0, P
′
D > 0),
∂VD
∂eD
∣∣∣∣
eD=0
> 0,
∂VD
∂eD
∣∣∣∣
eD=+∞
< 0, (30)
which implies that eSD > 0. Furthermore, since VD is smooth, it follows that e
S
D > 0 is a
solution to
γpi2
(
γ (1− pis)
1− γpis − 1
)(
K − b
1− γ
)
= P ′D (eD) + γpi2
PD
(
eSD
)
1− γpis . (31)
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8.2 Proof for Lemma 1
Let pic ≡ pi (e∗A, e∗D), pid ≡ pi (0, e∗D), and pis ≡ pi
(
0, eSD
)
denote the values of the re-election
probability function in the collusive, deviation and stationary path of play, respectively. It
is immediately clear that pic > pid. It remains to show that e∗D < e
S
D to guarantee that
pic > pid > pis.
Opposition’s effort, e∗D, in an arbitrary collusive equilibrium (B
∗
A ≥ 0, B∗D = 0, e∗A ≥ 0) is
the solution to the first order condition:
−P ′D (eD)− γpi2
(
K − b
1− γ
)
+ γpi2V
C
D = 0, (32)
where pi2 = pi2 (e
∗
A, eD). Let eD (e
∗
A) be a solution. Differentiating (32) implicitly w.r.t. e
∗
A:
e′D (e
∗
A) =
γpi21
(
1− γ 1−pic
1−γpic
)(
K−b
1−γ
)
+ γpi21
PD(e∗D)
1−γpic
γpi22
(
γ 1−pi
c
1−γpic − 1
)(
K−b
1−γ
)
− γpi22 PD(e
∗
D)
1−γpic − P ′′D (eD)
< 0, (33)
since V CD =
γ(1−pic)
1−γpic
K−b
1−γ −
PD(e∗D)
1−γpic . Note that eD is a function of e
∗
A and all derivations of pi are
evaluated at (e∗A, eD (e
∗
A)). Since both pi and PD (eD) are concave, the denominator is positive.
Also pi21 < 0, so the nominator is negative.
Note that eD (0) ≡ eSD. Since e′D (e∗A) < 0, an increase in army’s effort reduces eD. For
any eA > 0, opposition’s effort e
∗
D < e
S
D. We conclude that pi
c > pid > pis.
8.3 Proof for Proposition 3
Consider an arbitrary collusive equilibrium (B∗A ≥ 0, e∗A ≥ 0, e∗D ≥ 0, B∗D = 0). The leader
chooses, in the beginning of any subgame, both eA and BA such that his equilibrium PDV
payoff, V CL is maximised:
maxV CL = max{BA,eA≥0}
K −BA
1− βpi + β
(1− pi)
1− βpi
u
1− β , (34)
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s.t.V CL ≥ V DL (35)
V CA ≥ V DA (36)
K −BA ≥ 0, (37)
where pi = pi (eA, e
∗
D). The first order conditions are:
∂V CL
∂BA
= − 1
1− βpi − λ1 + λ2 − λ3 = 0 (38)
∂V CL
∂eA
=
βpi1 (K −BA − u)
(1− βpi)2 + λ1
[
β2 (K − u)
1− βpis (pi1 (2pi − pi
s))
]
− λ2
(
∂BA
∂eA
)
= 0 (39)
λ1
[
β2pi (pi − pis) (K − u)
1− βpis −BA
]
= 0, (40)
λ2
[
BA −
δ
(
pi − pid − δpi (pis − pid))
1− δpis b− δ (1− pi)LA (eA)
]
= 0, (41)
λ3 [K −BA] = 0, (42)
with complementary slackness for (40)-(42), and with pi1 = pi1 (eA, e
∗
D).
First note that λ3 = 0, since otherwise from (42), K = BA and substituting this into (40)
yields β
2pi(pi−pis)(K−u)
1−βpis −K < 0, since β
2pi(pi−pis)K
1−βpis −K < 0. We also rule out λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = 0,
since from (38) this would imply − 1
1−βpi 6= 0.
Given λ3 = 0, it remains to consider (1) λ1 > 0, λ2 = 0, (2) λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0 and (3)
λ1 = 0, λ2 > 0. From (38), λ1 > 0, λ2 = 0 cannot hold, since this would imply λ1 = − 11−βpi .
If λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0, then solving for λ1 from (38) and substituting this into (39), we obtain
λ1 =
(1− βpi)
(
δb(pi1(1−δ(pis−pid)))
1−δpis + δ (1− pi)L′A − δpi1LA
)
− βpi1 (K −BA − u)
(1− βpi)2
[
β2(K−u)
1−βpis (pi1 (2pi − pis))−
(
δb(pi1(1−δ(pis−pid)))
1−δpis + δ (1− pi)L′A − δpi1LA
)] < 0,
(43)
since K  0. We conclude that λ1 = 0, λ2 > 0 and λ3 = 0, and the binding constraint is
(36). The optimal bribe is given by
B∗A =
δ
(
pic − pid − δpic (pis − pid))
1− δpis b+ δ (1− pi
c)LA (e
∗
A) . (44)
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It is increasing in e∗A:
∂B∗A
∂e∗A
=
δ
(
pi1
(
1− δ (pis − pid)))
1− δpis b+ δ (1− pi
c)L′A − δpi1LA > 0, (45)
8.4 Proof for Corollary 1
Army’s effort, e∗A, is the solution to the leader’s FOC:
βpi1
(
K − u− δ(pi
c(1−δ(pis−pid)−pid))
1−δpis b− δ (1− pic)LA
)
(1− βpic)2 −
δ(pi1(1−δ(pis−pid)))
1−δpis b+ δ (1− pic)L′A − δpi1LA
1− βpic ,
(46)
where army’s IC condition (36) is directly substituted into the leader’s objective function
(34). By total differentiation, we obtain, since pi11
(pi1)
2 >
2β
1−βpic , K > u+B
∗
A +
1
1−βpic
∂2B∗A
∂(e∗A)
2 , and
∂2B∗A
∂(e∗A)
2 =
δ(pi11(1−δ(pis−pid)))
1−δpis b+ δ (1− pic)L′′A − 2δpi1L′A − δpi11LA < 0:
de∗A
dK
=
− βpi1
(1−βpic)2[
βpi11
(1−βpic)2 +
2(βpi1)
2
(1−βpic)3
]
(K − u−B∗A)− 2βpi1(1−βpic)2
∂B∗A
∂e∗A
− 1
1−βpic
∂2B∗A
∂(e∗A)
2
> 0, (47)
de∗A
du
=
βpi1
(1−βpic)2[
βpi11
(1−βpic)2 +
2(βpi1)
2
(1−βpic)3
]
(K − u−B∗A)− 2βpi1(1−βpic)2
∂B∗A
∂e∗A
− 1
1−βpic
∂2B∗A
∂(e∗A)
2
< 0, (48)
de∗A
dβ
=
−
[
pi1
(1−βpic)2 +
2βpi1pic
(1−βpic)3
]
(K − u−B∗A)− pi
c
(1−βpic)2
∂B∗A
∂(e∗A)
2[
βpi11
(1−βpic)2 +
2(βpi1)
2
(1−βpic)3
]
(K − u−B∗A)− 2βpi1(1−βpic)2
∂B∗A
∂e∗A
− 1
1−βpic
∂2B∗A
∂(e∗A)
2
> 0. (49)
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